Recent Publications by unknown
Recent Publications
The Electronic Silk Road: How the Binds the World Together in Commerce. By
Anupam Chander. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013. Pp xxii. 278.
Price: $20.09 (Hardcover) Reviewed by Grace Heusner and Daniel
Sheehan.
In The Electronic Silk Road, Anupam Chander urges the establishment of
a new international trade regulatory scheme: "[W]e must dismantle the logisti-
cal and regulatory barriers . . . to trade while at the same time ensuring that
public policy objectives cannot easily be evaded through a simple jurisdictional
sleight of hand or keystroke" (p. 34). With the emergence of the Internet as a
revolutionary platform for provision of services worldwide, Chander claims
that the "existing infrastructure of trade, developed over millennia for a para-
digm of goods, proves inadequate either to enable or to regulate" (p. 4).
The Electronic Silk Road focuses on some of the legal issues surrounding
"Trade 2.0," Chander's term for today's globalized trade network of "under-
sea fiber-optic cables and satellite links, ferrying electrons brimming with in-
formation" (p. 1). Chander compares this "Trade 2.0" to the Silk Road of antiq-
uity, which linked "the ancient world's civilizations . . . through deserts and
mountain passes, traversed by caravans laden with the world's treasures." (p.
1). As the ancient Silk Road transformed the lands it covered, modern technol-
ogy offers a new ability to offer services to the world from a desk in Silicon
Valley or Bangalore and a promise to transform the world.
In his book, Chander identifies legal roadblocks that complicate the pro-
spects for establishing a regulatory infrastructure for managing the global trade
in electronic services, such as state sovereignty and jurisdictional limitations.
Another problem in the current network of trade is uncertainty about which na-
tion's (or international) law applies to various international and transnational
transactions. In addition to helping mitigate that issue, Chander claims that
the establishment of an effective infrastructure is critical to avoiding a world-
wide race to a deregulated bottom. To mitigate these dangers of local control in
these worldwide transactions, Chander posits a solution of "glocalization"-the
"requir[ement] of a global service to conform to local rules" (p. 11). Combining
this idea of "glocalization" with the harmonization of domestic and internation-
al laws, Chander preaches "harmonization where possible, glocalization where
necessary" (p. 11).
The Electronic Silk Road's structure allows Chander to address a variety
of issues in electronic trade of services and goods. He first describes obstacles
to the functioning of this new network in chapter case studies of controversies
in cybertrade. In the second half of his book, Chander proffers a framework for
"breaking down barriers to free trade while protecting public policy objectives"
(p. 12). The Electronic Silk Road is written in a conversational tone, making it
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appealing to a wide audience. However, this accessibility may come at the cost
of in-depth analysis. Some of the chapters feel rushed, merely scraping the sur-
face of what are complex issues of economic and political importance. By try-
ing to appeal to diverse interests, The Electronic Silk Road has perhaps taken
on too much without fleshing out the nuances of any particular issue.
For example, in the chapter called "Pirates of Cyberspace," Chander urg-
es that the problem of individual countries' differing privacy laws, especially in
the case of user data, demonstrates the "difficulty of enforcing rights abroad"
(p. 14). In fewer than twenty-five pages, Chander rattles through five case stud-
ies of companies who have engaged in behavior that "asserts its legitimacy un-
der the laws of its home country, but [] is denounced as a pirate by authorities
elsewhere" (p. 89). He describes the factual and legal underpinnings of these
circumstances to support his argument that there is a need for regulation and
uniformity in global trade laws. Specifically, Chander describes the United
States's legal action in the establishment of an online gambling haven in Anti-
gua (pp. 89-93); in a copyright infringement suit against peer-to-peer file trad-
ing system Kazaa (pp. 93-95); against the unlicensed music downloads sold
through Russian company AllofMP3 (pp. 95-98); against Swedish organization
The Pirate Bay's leaking of the American movie Shrek 2 (pp. 98-100); and
against leaks related to Julian Assange's WikiLeaks (p. 100-05). Although the-
se case studies support Chander's claim, they are so abbreviated that some
readers might be lost, while others might be bored with the bird's-eye view of a
complicated issue.
Chander's account of the emerging "Trade 2.0" regime portrays govern-
ments as mere rule-makers and gatekeepers. They set and enforce the regula-
tions that service companies need to follow, but they aren't significant actors in
international trade. It is private companies and organizations - whether Face-
book or WikiLeaks-with whom consumers interact, and whose services con-
sumers must be willing to trust.
The international reaction to Edward Snowden's revelations about the
National Security Agency's activities in cyberspace complicates Chander's ac-
count. Snowden's exposure of the NSA's global surveillance programs has
elicited strong reactions from governments around the world (some of whose
leaders were the targets of NSA spying), consumers and consumer watchdog
groups, and many of the private companies at the center of Chander's story.
Snowden's revelations make clear that private companies are not the only bod-
ies in need of regulation on the Internet, and that consumers who purchase ser-
vices online are not dealing simply with such companies. Governments them-
selves are conducting involuntary one-way transfers of information with
Internet users, and their clandestine activities may pose more of a threat to pub-
lic welfare than the activities of private companies. In particular, the United
States federal government, whose regulatory ambit includes most of the service
providers Chander discusses, has been shown to be as active a collector of data
as any regulated service vendor.
If the NSA revelations have moved governments to the forefront of dis-
cussions about regulation of the internet, what implications does this have for
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the future of Trade 2.0? Chander makes a compelling case for the importance
of liberalizing trade in services (guided by principles of technological neutrality
and dematerialization) while maintaining protections for local exercises of sov-
ereignty (guided by principles of glocalization and harmonization). Is this
agenda for trade in services threatened by the reaction to Snowden's NSA dis-
closures and, more broadly, the new attention drawn to governments' surveil-
lance activities online? There are reasons to believe that it is.
First, the reaction of governments around the world to the NSA revela-
tions may result in a re-structuring of some of the basic arteries of e-commerce.
In March, the U.S. Department of Commerce announced that it would cede its
role in overseeing the system of Internet addresses and domain names to an in-
ternational body.I Since 1998, the California-based non-profit Internet Corpo-
ration for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) has contracted with the
Commerce Department to assign IP addresses and domain names and to con-
nect the two.2 Chander mentions ICANN as an example of a "chokepoint" that
could be used to enforce regulatory authority over online service companies.3
The transfer of power from a U.S. non-profit to an international body was driv-
en in large part by concerns about NSA spying from foreign governments.4
Second, the NSA disclosures have altered the relationship between pri-
vate companies that provide services online and their consumers. Revelations
that the U.S. government might be covertly collecting data from unwitting con-
sumers of services such as Facebook or Google may induce consumers to en-
gage less with these service providers at the margin. This effect will be particu-
larly acute where the service in question is free, because consumers are
implicitly paying for such services with their data. Indeed, some analysts have
predicted that the NSA spying disclosures could result in losses for cloud com-
puting companies of up to $35 billion by 2016.5 The private companies who
have been targets of NSA spying are well aware of the threat posed to their bot-
tom lines by Snowden's revelations, and some have taken their concerns direct-
ly to President Barack Obama.6
The emergence of governments as active (if largely covert) players in in-
I Edward Wyatt, U.S. to Cede Its Oversight ofAddresses on Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14,
2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/15/technology/us-to-give-up-role-in-internet-domain-names
.html.
2 Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Department of Commerce and Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, INTERNET CORP. FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS
(Dec. 31, 1999), http://www.icann.org/en/about/agreements/mou-jpalicann-mou-25nov98-en.htm; see
also Statement of Policy, Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31741 (June 5,
1998), available at http://www.icann.org/en/about/agreements/white-paper.
ANUPAM CHANDER, THE ELECTRONIC SILK ROAD 110 (2013).
4 Wyatt, supra note 1.
DANIEL CASTRO, How Much Will Prism Cost the US. Cloud Computing Industry?, INFO.
TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND. 3 (2013), http://www2.itif.org/2013-cloud-computing-costs.pdf; see also
Claire Cain Miller, Revelations ofN.S.A. Spying Cost U.S. Tech Companies, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/22/business/fallout-from-snowden-hurting-bottom-line-of-tech-
companies.html.
6 See, e.g., Vindu Goel, Facebook's Zuckerberg Complains to Obama Over Government Spying, N.Y.
TIMES BLOG: BITS (Mar. 13, 2014, 5:36 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/03/13/facebooks-
zuckerberg-complains-to-obama-over-govemment-spying.
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ternational service transactions thus risks throwing the liberalization of Trade
2.0 off course. Allowing that "[e]xcessive assertions of local law may unduly
Balkanize the Internet," Chander suggests that "states should seek to harmonize
their rules where possible, maintaining heterogeneous rules only after due con-
sideration" (p. 14). Fleshing out those rules in more detail, as well as Chander's
proposed utilization of the 1995 Global Agreement on Trade in Services, would
be useful. If Chander's vision of a liberalized and harmonized regime of online
trade in services is to come to fruition, the regulation of governments must be a
concern of policy-makers alongside the regulation of private companies.
Promoting the Rule of Law in Post-Conflict States. By Laura Grenfell. New
York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2013. Pp. vi, 324. Price: $115.00
(Hardback). Reviewed by Ashwita Ambast.
Rule of law was constructed by Western sovereign governments as the
antithesis of traditional customary laws that prevailed in their colonies. During
the Cold War, rule of law distinguished the communist East from the West. In
the twentieth century, rule of law was perceived as the means of protecting
international human rights and was the premise of the institutions involved in
transitioning former colonies into market democracies. Recent, palpable
failures of the rule of law model-perhaps most vividly, in Iraq-have led to
demands for institutions with more popular legitimacy.
As early as 1981, Marc Galanter explicated the limited role of the formal
judicial system in enforcing law. He stated that "any major advance in our
understanding of how official legal regulation works in society depends on
knowing more about indigenous law and about its interaction with official
law."7 Taking a cue from Galanter, Laura Grenfell's Promoting the Rule of
Law in Post Conflict States is a piercing critique of the modern, blanket
application of rule-of-law models to post-conflict states. It is an application that
has failed to account meaningfully for prevalent, authoritative customary
norms. 'Legal pluralism' acknowledges that the formal state is not the
exclusive source of legal authority and that local leaders administering
traditional norms carry equal legitimacy. It poses a formidable challenge to
rule-of-law models. Grenfell recognizes the chief shortcoming of legal
pluralism: traditional customs can be unjust and are easily manipulated.
However, she notes that acknowledging legal pluralism is a prerequisite for the
popular legitimacy and long-term stability of a new state.
Grenfell substantiates her claims by examining the interaction between
Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and Indigenous Law, 19
J. LEGAL PLURALISM& UNOFFICIAL L. 1, 27 (1981).
Responding to the state-centric approach of the debate between the legal positivists and the
natural law theorists on "what is law," Galanter and others have argued that "law" should include a
variety of normative orders that are not state-related. See generally Galanter, supra note 1, at 1-2
(questioning importance of external forum for dispute resolution); John Griffiths, What is Legal
Pluralism?, 24 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 1, 1 (1986) ("[B]y 'legal pluralism' I mean the
presence in a social field of more than one legal order."); Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW
& SoC'Y REV. 869, 872 (1988) (outlining scholarship on legal pluralism).
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rule of law and legal pluralism in South Africa and East Timor. Grenfell
explains that while the South African Constitution incorporated both
"civilized" international standards and indigenous norms, it did not give
sufficient consideration to the relationship between legal pluralism and rule of
law (pp. 113-129). The Constitution and subsequent legislation made
compromises that resulted in sharp divisions between traditional "customary
law" and western legal norms (pp. 128, 131). Similarly, the United Nations
Transitional Administration in East Timor neglected local custom. The
constitutional "mother law" was a patchwork of international norms mired in
rule of law rhetoric (pp. 199, 213). Because citizens cannot relate to the new
law, East Timor's rule of law institutions have failed and the authority of courts
and law enforcement officials is under question (pp. 230-32).
Today, South Africa and East Timor struggle to harmonize custom and
formal law. Creating norms for the identification of custom in formal courts of
law has proved challenging in South Africa (pp. 177-80). While the 2012 South
African Traditional Courts Bill recognizes the authority of customary courts, it
is a feeble attempt as "[i]t transforms legal pluralism [by changing] the key
features of the traditional justice system" while compromising fundamental
constitutional values (pp. 130-31). East Timor has taken similar remedial steps;
the Constitution recognizes custom that is not contrary to constitutional law,
courts have acknowledged out-of-court negotiations, the police have taken a
pragmatic approach by permitting resort to the traditional justice system when
appropriate, and the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation has
adopted a well-received hybrid approach (pp. 237, 255-58). However, at
present, neither the formal nor customary system is capable of offering
effective legal protection to citizens of East Timor (p. 263).
Without doubt, Grenfell makes a strong case for due consideration of
local custom. Her objection to the one-size-fits all approach taken by
international organizations and nation-states is persuasive. But at the same
time, Grenfell at the outset admits that her position is "undeniably state-centric"
(p. 13). That this is Grenfell's premise, in a book designed to question the
modern arbitrary conceptual limitations on legal authority and sovereignty, is
surprising.
Moreover, Grenfell's attempt at providing "a stronger understanding" of
the relationship between rule of law and legal pluralism leaves many things
unsaid (p. 8). How can transitional administrations best harmonize legal
pluralism and rule of law? While it is clear that there must be a compromise,
what direction must this compromise take? Grenfell explains that East Timor's
policy of supporting local mediation to resolve land-related disputes instils
stability in rural society, but elevates traditional patrilineal norms that vitiate
the inheritance rights of women (pp. 250-53). Grenfell states that this raises
crucial questions about what compromises are acceptable and whether
individual rights can be sacrificed at the altar of group rights. But having stated
the problem, she provides no real guidance on how to resolve it. Is there a
universal rule of law threshold that all custom must be tested against before
being considered valid? Grenfell states that in South Africa, customary norms
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must pass the threshold of equality and non-discrimination if they are to be
recognized as law by formal courts. But she also notes that this approach is
informed by South Africa's political history (p. 262). How far can the
experiences of East Timor and South Africa be applied to other states in the
process of building their constitutions? Grenfell fails to answer these questions.
Further, the book's intended audience is obscure. Grenfell concludes by
addressing generally the "international community" (p. 273). However, one
might expect a book designed to improve post-conflict constitutionalism to
delineate who in particular should shoulder the important responsibility of
effectuating the delicate balance between pluralism and rule of law. Grenfell
attributes the general reluctance of the United Nations to dispense with the rule
of law model and its ambivalence toward legal pluralism to the United
Nations's commitment to a fixed notion of international human rights and its
continuing partiality to the Western liberal tradition (pp. 49-53). International
development agencies and financial institutions are driven by profit and benefit
from Westphalian systems, as they are founded on state membership and
support from sovereign states (p. 58). The motivations of internal, national
political parties can be opportunistic, as seen in Grenfell's analysis of African
National Congress appeasement of traditional leaders in return for political
support (p. 123). Which body, then, is best placed to arrive at meaningful
compromises between internal and external legitimacy, group rights and
individual rights, and local and international norms? Is it a combination of the
parties mentioned above? Throughout her book, Grenfell repeatedly calls for
greater participation by the citizenry. But how is this best achieved?
In short, while Grenfell makes a valuable observation about the
importance of recognizing local custom in bolstering the internal legitimacy
and long term stability of a state, she provides no explanation for why such
recognition is necessary, how it should be arrived at, and who is responsible for
implementing it. At the end of Promoting the Rule of Law in Post Conflict
States, the reader is left with far more questions than answers.
The Idea of Arbitration. By Jan Paulsson. Oxford, UK: Oxford University
Press, 2013. Pp. ix, 301. Price: $34.00 (Paperback). Reviewed by Farshad
Ghodoosi.
The idea of arbitration is simple. It is a type of dispute resolution
mechanism in which disputes are adjudicated through private arbitrator(s)
where both parties have consented. Yet this simple idea fosters a host of
challenges mainly due to its private nature. Paulsson's book gives a sweeping
account of the idea of arbitration and its challenges. In a relatively short piece,
Paulsson manages to familiarize the readers with underlying theories and
pressing issues related to arbitration in today's world. This well-organized and
succinct book also introduces several new theoretical ideas. As Paulsson states
in the foreword, this book is not about the practice of arbitration. At the same
time, the book also avoids becoming overly abstract. However, the book
remains an introduction, and fails to deeply engage with political philosophy
and international relations theories. Paulsson's book offers new approaches on
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three issues concerning arbitration: its underpinning political philosophy, its
locus of authority, and the public challenge. Although novel in approach, these
discussions do not provide a profoundly new framework.
Paulsson's discussion of the political philosophy of arbitration at the
onset of the book is the book's main contribution. Paulsson ties the idea of
arbitration to the liberty (and not efficiency) of being governed by the law of
our choosing (p. 2). His view of arbitration is centered on a matter of "political
philosophy, not social engineering" (p. 2). According to him, that is the reason
totalitarian regimes do not welcome the idea of arbitration. After all, arbitration
creates a crack in the edifice of the justice system of which states believe they
are the sole provider. Paulsson argues that in a free society, individuals should
be able to devise a resolution mechanism for their disputes even if it does not
conform to the procedural prescriptions of the legislature (p. 23). This
intellectual move, although auspicious, is not backed by an in-depth analysis of
the underlying political philosophy of arbitration. It is an invite to ponder on
the issue rather than a thorough discussion of it. It takes for granted that
arbitration is a product of liberal ideas without venturing into other potential
justifications including the critical legal study approach.
Another major contribution of Paulsson's book is its identification of a
new locus of authority for international arbitration. The underlying authority by
which arbitrators are allowed to adjudicate controversies before them is a
thorny challenge in the theory of arbitration. Simply put, this issue touches the
very foundation of the legitimacy of arbitrators' authority. This is the focus of
Chapter 2. Paulsson's reference to the Texaco Case demonstrates the subtlety
of the matter. In that case, the Libyan government expropriated investments of
two U.S. oil companies following the revolution in 1969. Libya argued that its
concession agreement with the oil companies was void because the governing
law was Libyan law, and thus the new decree rendered them, along with the
arbitration clause, unenforceable. The Arbitrator, Dupuy, deftly distinguished
between the law that governs the contract (lex contractus) and the law that
makes the arbitral proceedings binding (lex arbitri).9 In the case, the arbitration
was ultimately found to receive its authority from international, not Libyan, law
(p. 31).10 In Legal Theory ofInternational Arbitration, Emmanuel Gaillard has
developed three theses concerning the legitimizing order of arbitration.II
Paulsson adopts Gaillard's categorization of these theses, but also adds a fourth
category. The first thesis believes that the law of the place of arbitration grants
authority to arbitrators (territorial thesis). The second thesis argues that the
transnational effect of arbitral awards make them enforceable in multiple
countries (pluralistic thesis). The third proposal stems from the particular way
that several French scholars, including Gaillard, view arbitration. They believe
in an autonomous transnational order distinct from national orders that grant
9 The idea was adopted from the distinction made by Georges van Hecke, Belgian scholar-
advocate, between "law which governs the contract and the legal order from which the binding nature of
the contract stems made a distinction" (p. 31).
to Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. v. Libya, 17 I.L.M. 1 (1978).
11 EMMANUEL GAILLARD, LEGAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2010).
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authority to arbitrators (arbitral order thesis). Paulsson posits that the arbitral
order thesis is a derivative form of the pluralistic form and not an independent
category (p. 40), arguing that reference to a transnational arbitral order in
several French decisions does not attest to the existence of such an order (p.
44). He then proceeds to offer a revised version of the pluralistic thesis. The
thrust of his argument is that there are non-state actors both nationally
(vertically) and internationally (horizontally) affecting arbitration in practice.
Although in some ways more nuanced, Paulsson's account does not seem to be
distinct from Gaillard's approach. His theoretical endeavor simply aims to
include the cross-border social institutions that have significant impact on
international arbitration.12 Neither his work nor Gaillard's book provides a
persuasive and rigorous account of the authoritative grammar underlying
today's international arbitration.
Paulsson's discussion of the public challenge serves as the third salient
discussion of the book. It deals with the tension arising from the interaction
between private arbitrations and state regulations. The tension goes to the heart
of the extent to which states can tolerate parallel justice systems. Paulsson
begins by addressing public policy concerns that suggest that states limit or
cease arbitration practice altogether. Consumer protection concerns, including
boilerplate arbitration clauses that are not subject to "bargain" between parties,
are paramount examples invoked to stress the negative effects of arbitration.
Paulsson states that these concerns do not justify jettisoning the entire arbitral
process, notwithstanding the shortcomings (p. 115). Paulsson continues this
discussion by touching on the controversial issue of arbitrability. Legislators
quite often declare certain controversies-anti-trust and intellectual property,
for example-not to be arbitrable, or out of arbitration's reach. The scope of
and rationale underlying the issue of arbitrability remain deeply unsettled.
Paulsson argues that "legislators should not rush to declare entire categories of
transactions off-limits to arbitrations" just because certain private or public
interests are unrepresented in arbitral proceedings (p. 123). In fact, courts can
always supervise awards for these matters at the enforcement stage. Following
this discussion, Paulsson addresses the controversial issue of what ought to be
considered "against public policy." Pursuant to the New York Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, national courts
can refuse arbitral awards that are against public policy of that country.1 The
question that Paulsson aims to resolve is whether arbitral tribunals assess
matters of public policy independent of national courts. Similar to the existing
2 In this section, Paulsson does not involve the literature on non-state actors' influence in
international relations, for instance, the English School. See generally, e.g., HEDLEY BULL, THE
ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS (1977); BARRY BUZAN, FROM
INTERNATIONAL TO WORLD SOCIETY? ENGLISH SCHOOL THEORY AND THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF
GLOBALIZATION (2004).
1 The New York Convention is the principal document for enforcement of international arbi-
tral awards. Article V, paragraph 2 stipulates that: "Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award
may also be refused if the competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is
sought finds that: ... (b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public
policy of that country." Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
art. 5, para. 2, June 10,1958, 330 U.N.T.S 3.
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literature, he does not attempt to dissect and analyze the notion of public policy
itself.l4 Instead he stops at the suggestion of a few procedural proposals. He
first distinguishes matters of public policy from those that are explicitly
prohibited by law (i.e. arbitrability). He proposes that arbitral tribunals could
adjudicate matters of public policy. Courts should be deferential to arbitral
decisions on matters of public policy if they are subjective, meaning that they
do not have established precedents. The main contribution of this discussion
lies in revisiting the public policy challenge to arbitration in a systematic way.
Yet, resolving the public challenge requires substantive and theoretical
discussion of what "public" is for the arbitral process, a matter that, like in
other relevant scholarship, is missing in Paulsson's discussion,.
The book continues the discussion of the public challenge in Chapter 7
under the rubric of the international challenge. This Chapter endeavors to
explain the reason that international arbitration is the best practicable cross-
border dispute resolution currently available for disputants, albeit not ideal.
Paulsson emphasizes the importance of international arbitration in today's
world by demonstrating the inefficiencies of worldwide transnational judgment
enforcement. He resumes his discussion of public policy in here, this time in
the international setting. The enforcement of arbitral awards in various
countries always runs the risk of national courts finding such enforcement
contrary to their public policy. Paulsson reiterates some of his assertions
regarding the notion of public policy in Chapter 7, but also proposes a two-
level approach to mandatory norms, labeling the levels "ordinary mandatory
norms" and "overriding mandatory norms" (p. 229). Mandatory norms are
fundamental norms that shape the public policy of each country. In cases
involving ordinary mandatory norms, national courts should defer to arbitral
judgment if the matter was properly considered. In cases involving overriding
mandatory norms, the stakes of public interest are so high that arbitral
determination could be challenged in front of national courts (p. 229). A
categorization of mandatory rules/public policy concerns is much needed in
today's international arbitration. However, there is no convincing theoretical
discussion in Paulsson's book that could help us draw the fine line between
different levels of mandatory rules. This is a quite laborious and challenging
task, but one that should be accomplished.
The remaining discussions of the book mainly consist of a thorough
reiteration of the existing literature and lack the significant contribution of the
three points mentioned above. Paulsson investigates other potential challenges
against arbitration. He divides them into two categories: private challenges
(Chapter 3) and ethical challenges (Chapter 5). Chapter 3 offers a sweeping but
unoriginal overview of challenges to the private nature of arbitration. Paulsson
reviews theories of separability, competence-competence, arbitrability and
eventually lauds the American Supreme Court approach.' 5 According to this
14 "We are still left with the daunting task of determining, in difficult cases, what may be
intolerable by the standards of public policy" (p. 136).
Is Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006); First Option of Chicago,
Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995).
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approach, courts should only decide challenges to the arbitration agreement
(clause) itself. Challenges brought on contracts incorporating arbitration
clauses, the scope of arbitration, and other related claims should be decided
conclusively by the arbitral body (p. 81). Paulsson proceeds to elaborate on the
distinction between admissibility and jurisdiction, a theory that he pioneered in
international arbitration. Simply put, admissibility refers to the timeliness of
claims, whereas jurisdiction refers to the authority of arbitral tribunals to
adjudicate the matter before them. Decisions related to admissibility are final,
while decisions on jurisdiction are reviewable by national courts (p. 83). 16
The Ethical Challenge deals with the Achilles' heel of arbitration.
Paulsson provides a thorough account of various ethical issues arising in
arbitration. He keenly observes that unless arbitrators take full ethical
responsibility, legislators will likely step in to rectify the ethical shortcomings
of the current system sooner or later (p. 149). To the disappointment of the
readers, Paulsson does not propose an extensive overhaul or re-design of
arbitration that would meet most ethical challenges. Quite the contrary, he
seems reluctant to offer any alternative. For instance, regarding the existing
system in which each party appoints an arbitrator, he states:
[G]iven the present reality that we must live with
unilaterally appointed arbitrators and that in some
situations one cannot realistically expect impartiality or
independence on their part, or even be in a position to
inform one's self of such a person's record and
reputation in a far-off environment, the stature and
rectitude of the presiding arbitrator becomes even more
important (p. 165).
Simply put, Paulsson seems to complacently accept the existing system,
although he admits that the system has a major weakness from an ethical
standpoint.
Legal activism in arbitration is the focus of Chapter 8-a new, yet
underdeveloped theory. The question is whether arbitral bodies, in
implementing their law-application task, could investigate the lawfulness of
certain laws. This remains highly controversial, but Paulsson shows a tendency
to support more arbitral activism in this realm (pp.254-55). The last Chapter
lays out Paulsson's suggestions for improving arbitration. He advocates for
more cooperation with courts, more inclusiveness, less unilateral appointment,
and more transparency, among other recommendations.
Paulsson's Idea of Arbitration offers a thought-provoking discussion on
three crucial aspects of arbitration: its underpinning political philosophy, its
16 However, the "jurisdiction/admissibility" distinction is not of much help in cases where
the language is vague or overreaching. Oftentimes language incorporated in arbitration clauses could be
interpreted to refer to both jurisdiction as well as admissibility. For instance, imagine that a contract
stipulates that non-conformity of delivered goods would allow the aggrieved party to institute arbitration
within thirty days. In this case, both the thirty-day limit and determination of the non-conformity of
goods are important factors in determining the authority of the arbitral tribunal.
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locus of authority, and the public challenge. Yet, these ideas remain
underdeveloped at times, and Paulsson often avoids engaging discussions on
similar topics in legal and political philosophy or international relations theory.
Legal Orientalism:China, the United States, and Modern Law. By Teemu
Ruskola. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013. Pp. xii, 338.
Price: $39.95 (Hardback). Reviewed by Idriss Fofana and Peter Tzeng.
In 1906, Congress established the United States Court for China and
conferred upon it exclusive jurisdiction over U.S. citizens in the District of
China. At the time, American exercise of judicial power in China was by no
means a new phenomenon: ad-hoc U.S. consular courts had been assuming this
responsibility since the Treaty of Wanghia in 1844. The Treaty established that
American citizens accused of crimes in China would be tried under American
law and by American authorities. The justification was simple: China was
"lawless and despotic" (p. 50).
Legal scholars today would find these courts repugnant to the
fundamental tenets of state sovereignty. The Supreme Court on more than one
occasion has staunchly defended the presumption that "United States law
governs domestically but does not rule the world."17 Yet in his book Legal
Orientalism: China, the United States and Modern Law, comparative legal
scholar Teemu Ruskola suggests that this presumption only obscures a long
history of extraterritorial application of U.S. law which persists today through
discussions on the rule of law.
Indeed, while the creation of American courts in and for China may seem
like a relic of a bygone era of global imperialism, Ruskola contends that legal
Orientalism continues to structure current Western understanding of law in
China, and outside the West in general. In Chapter 2, Ruskola borrows from the
theories of Edward Said to describe legal Orientalism as "a set of interlocking
narratives about what is and is not law, and who are and are not its proper
subjects" (p. 5). These narratives have historically depicted China as lacking
law and the United States as the exemplar of a state governed by the rule of
law. Through this framework, Ruskola discusses how notions of China and its
people as fundamentally lawless helped justify not only a U.S. Court of China
but also the Chinese exclusion laws. Ruskola seeks to expose Orientalist
discourses in law through three major approaches: first, by deploying post-
colonial theory to elucidate the relationship between the United States and
China with respect to the law, second, by analyzing historical forms of the
corporation in the United States and China and third, by exploring the history
and origins of the United States Court of China. Today, neither the U.S. Court
for China nor Chinese exclusion laws continue to exist, and "[e]xclusive
territorial jurisdiction is one of the defining features of the sovereignty of the
modem nation-state" (p. 113). Yet legal Orientalism, Ruskola argues, continues
to influence interactions between the West and China today, albeit in novel
17 Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454 (2007).
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forms.
One such form which Ruskola points to is corporate law. Over the past
few decades, American corporate law has come to "rule the world." As Ruskola
observes, over a decade ago, Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman were
already anticipating a "global convergence of legal development along the lines
of U.S. corporation law" (p. 61). Few countries embody this trend better than
China, which liberalized its economy and enacted dramatic American reforms
to its corporate law in its quest to join the WTO. The WTO and other post-
World War II international institutions have been "so effective in harmonizing
legal regimes across the world," argues Ruskola, "that in many areas, especially
ones pertaining to the economy, it would be largely redundant for the United
States to assert its laws extraterritorially" (p. 205). While radically different
from the imposition of extraterritoriality in China, this indirect form of legal
imperialism continues to depend on longstanding Orientalist discourses.
Ruskola's discussion limits itself to China. Yet the questions that Ruskola
raises throughout his book carry great relevance to modem issues outside of
U.S.-China relations. Extraterritorial jurisdiction, for one, remains a very active
debate today. The U.S. Court for China may have been abolished, but the
Supreme Court has confronted the question of extraterritorial jurisdiction in
two recent cases: Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Company'8 and Daimler
AG v. Bauman.19 Moreover, the U.S. government continues to try alleged
enemy combatants before military tribunals domestically. Does the perceived
failure of foreign legal systems to deal with foreign controversies justify the
extraterritorial application of American law? Or do American courts only apply
extraterritorial jurisdiction when it is convenient? In 1993, the Supreme Court
held in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council20 that the United States is not bound by
its non-refoulement obligations under the Refugee Convention on the high seas.
And in March 2014, the Obama administration took the stance before the
Human Rights Committee that its obligations under the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights do not apply extraterritorially.
The bottom line is that the notion of exercising jurisdiction in "lands of
lawlessness" has not disappeared with the U.S. District Court for China. In the
realm of cyberspace, at least one modem scholar has considered a modem
equivalent of extraterritorial extension of American jurisdiction. In 1992
Professor Henry H. Perritt, Jr. put forth the idea of a U.S. District Court for the
District of Cyberspace. The court would exercise jurisdiction over all of
cyberspace, in order to promote "international standards" of cyberspace law,
especially in countries where intellectual property, for example, is not protected
according to American standards. Does the United States have the right to set
these standards?
Extraterritoriality is not a concept unique to the United States. Belgium
and Spain have enacted universal jurisdiction laws, but they have faced
18 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011).
1 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
20 509 U.S. 155 (1993).
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considerable obstacles. After the Arrest Warrant Case before the International
Court of Justice in 2002, the Belgium parliament repealed its universal
jurisdiction law. And in February 2014, the Spanish parliament limited its own
universal jurisdiction law for the second time, after a judge opened an inquiry
into human rights violations in Tibet, provoking the ire of Chinese authorities.
The question remains, how may governments in the West promote legal values
without reinforcing Orientalist discourses?
Although Legal Orientalism implicates these pressing modern issues,
Ruskola devotes a surprisingly small portion of his book-the epilogue-to
discussing the consequences of legal Orientalism today. In fact, until the
epilogue, Legal Orientalism reads essentially like an edited volume of distinct
articles that share a broad theme but have little else in common. Until the
epilogue, Ruskola does not provide a satisfying explanation of the relationship
between Qing-era Chinese corporations, the U.S. district court for China, and
Said's Orientalism. In an attempt to encourage communication between the
post-colonial theorist, the comparative legal scholar, and the historian, Ruskola
adopts the jargon and theoretical frameworks of each, without fully engaging
these distinct perspectives with each other. As a result, while comparative legal
scholars would likely find themselves drawn to Ruskola's exploration of the
origins of the corporation in imperial China and the United States, they may
have difficulty wading through the complex and jargon-heavy analyses of
Orientalist discourses in the law. Ruskola's apparent mastery of a wide range of
disciplines works against him in this context.
The limitations of Ruskola's approach are most obvious in his attempt to
reconcile post-colonial theory and comparative law. Part of the problem is that
he fails to adopt some of the nuances that post-colonial theory has developed
over the several decades since Said in his depiction of the East-West binary.
While previous generations of American scholars have certainly depicted China
as intrinsically lawless, clichds of a country governed by an excessively
legalistic bureaucracy represented by the aloof mandarin are also widespread.
At the same time, the United States has not always represented a paramount
respect for the rule of law. From tropes of the Wild West to modem avoidance
and violations of international law-including its "unsigning" of the Rome
Statute in 2002 and the invasion of Iraq without a U.N. Security Council
mandate in 2003-the United States has often stood for the proposition that
"might makes right" in the eyes of the international community. These
examples suggest that the borders between legal Orient and Occident remain
more dynamic than Ruskola admits.
Ruskola also has difficulty setting aside the critical approach of post-
colonial theory to propose clear and effective guidelines for legal scholars.
Ruskola contends that the pervasiveness of Orientalist discourses is such that
"we cannot help essentializing others, and even ourselves" (p. 54). Any
comparative endeavor therefore risks reducing the subject of the comparison to
a static clich6 that fails to capture the nuance and dynamism of the subject. And
yet, Ruskola concedes that "comparison is the only way for us ... to enter into
a world of similarities as well as differences, which in turn both provide
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boundaries for our subjectivity and allow us to connect with other subjects in
the world" (p. 54). How then may comparative legal scholars successfully
study non-Western societies without inappropriately evaluating them by
Western standards? The solution, according to Ruskola, is an "ethics of
Orientalism" which instead of simply decrying the evils of paternalist attitudes,
encourages comparativists to self-consciously temper the effects of their own
biases and to consider the broader implications of the comparisons they present.
Ruskola demonstrates this "ethics of Orientalism" in the third chapter,
through a comparison of the modern American corporate form and Qing-era
Chinese clan organizations. Rather than simply discussing how clan
organizations bore certain distinctly corporate aspects, Ruskola claims to
refrain from elevating the American corporate form to a universal standard by
also exploring elements of kinship in American corporations. While well-
meaning, Ruskola's attempt falls short of his own standards. Although he
spends over thirty pages discussing corporate aspects of the clan organization,
he dedicates only four to "provincializing"-that is rebutting the universalist
pretentions of-the modern American corporation. Ruskola's desire to place
the two comparisons on equal footing is so strained that it seems disingenuous.
What seems important, and particularly relevant to comparative legal scholars,
is not a mechanical adherence to bidirectional comparisons, but rather a critical
awareness of the discourses which structure the discipline and a willingness to
place the objects of study in their social and cultural context. In this regard,
comparative legal scholars have much to learn from German sinologists who
first applied the notion of Sitz im Leben, the contextual interpretation of biblical
texts based on their function in community life, to the study of Chinese
classics, thereby obviating the futile attempts of their predecessors to evaluate
classical Chinese thought by the standards of Enlightenment European
philosophy. Ruskola demonstrates the power of combining critical and
contextual interpretive approaches in the epilogue, when he finally applies the
tools of post-colonial theory and the history of U.S. legal imperialism in China,
to elucidate the relationship between China, the United States and law today.
Despite the shortcomings of his work, Ruskola makes a timely and
important contribution to both comparative and international law by calling the
attention of legal scholars to the problematic nature of discourses on the rule of
law. In his analysis, Ruskola cites Carl Schmitt's observation that "[w]hoever
invokes humanity wants to cheat" (p. 53). Legal Orientalism suggests that
whoever invokes law, and particularly the rule of law, may bear equally
duplicitous intentions. Certainly, this was the case of those who fought for the
establishment of the U.S District Court for China. At its best, Ruskola's work
could equip budding scholars of Chinese law with the tools to reclaim the
notion or rule of law in order to engage in more rigorous scholarship and to
interact as equals with their counterparts around the world. And although
Ruskola does not always provide a clear way to avoid the pitfalls of Orientalist
discourses, his own work, and particularly the epilogue, provides an excellent
example of a direction Chinese legal studies may take.
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Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts. By Yuval Shany. Oxford,
UK: Oxford University Press, 2014. Pp. xix, 322. Price: $101.19
(Hardback). Reviewed by Tasneem Ravindra Deo.
The proliferation of international courts and tribunals, having the power
to settle disputes, enforce commitments, and interpret norms ranging from
criminal responsibility to commercial transactions, has dramatically affected
the landscape of international law. It is no surprise therefore that scholarship
abounds on the desirability of international adjudication. Yuval Shany's
Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts seeks to add a new
dimension to the literature by reconceptualizing the framework within which
the performance of international judicial institutions is judged.
The book locates itself within the empirical literature and offers a method
to approach fundamental questions regarding the utility of international courts
in light of concerns about viability, negative side effects, and high costs (p. 3).
The central claim of the book is that effectiveness of an international court
must be assessed on the basis of attainment of the mandate providers' goals.
Shany argues that the goal-based approach provides new tools for measurement
of effectiveness and improves our understanding of the methodological limits
of the exercise. It enriches the discourse on the factors that render some courts
more effective than others, and challenges the reliability and utility of
effectiveness analyses which focus on "judgment-compliance, usage rate, and
impact on state conduct" (p. 5).
The book is divided into three parts. Part I describes the goal-based
effectiveness model, as well as its components, promise, limitations, and
measurement challenges. Part II analyzes the contribution of specific
effectiveness variables to judicial performance. Part III applies this goal-based
approach to five courts in an attempt to illustrate the application of the model
and its importance as a means of assessment of international courts.
The core of the book lies in Part I as it describes the framework of
assessment that Shany seeks to propose. Shany introduces the goal-based
approach by outlining the various social science approaches to defining
organizational effectiveness and discussing their suitability for assessing
international courts (pp. 13-16). This description is extremely helpful to
understanding the model he proposes and also comparing it to other existing
methods of data analysis. He convincingly argues that the open system
approach (focused on the sustainability of an institution's interaction with its
external environment) and the system resource approach (focusing on an
institution's ability to obtain the resources it needs to survive) are unsuitable on
account of their normative deficit, and the process oriented model (focusing on
the usefulness of an institution's tools for meeting its goals) and strategic
constituencies model (focusing on an institution's relationship with external
constituencies) are subsumed within the goal-based based approach. While he
is mindful of the importance of efficiency and cost effectiveness studies, he
chooses to engage with these only as an extension of the goal-based model. The
goal based approach he puts forth is primarily descriptive and analytical,
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neutral to the desirability of the goal itself. These organizational goals are
intended to serve as a normative baseline for effectiveness analysis (p. 17). The
strength of his articulation of the model lies in the clarity with which he
contextualizes it and outlines its limitations. He acknowledges that institutions'
goals may differ in their sources, level of abstraction, and degree of articulation
and also discusses goal ambiguity and time frame concerns (pp. 18-25).
Shany's identification of the goals of international courts springs from the
claim that the "thick brush" approach to judging effectiveness must be replaced
by institution-specific analysis (p. 31). While his choice to focus on the goals
articulated by mandate providers can be questioned as promoting a narrow
view of the role that international courts play within the larger scheme of
international law, it helps to contain the analysis. Furthermore, the model is
such that its application can be extended to goals as articulated by other
constituencies. In addition to the idiosyncratic goals of each international court,
the four generic goals that Shany identifies are: norm support, resolving
international disputes and problems, regime support, and legitimizing public
authority. Shany explains each of the four generic goals in detail, describing
their contours, limitations, correlation to effectiveness as a whole, change over
time and across courts, and differences in impact. He reviews earlier empirical
studies and anecdotal data that are relevant to these goals, including case law
and case studies, offering alternate explanations for their findings (pp. 37-46).
His discussion of these generic goals suggests their centrality to the study of
effectiveness and calls into doubt the importance afforded to idiosyncratic
goals. To this extent, the generic goals seem to subsume the idiosyncratic goals
and therefore threaten the specificity in assessment of the courts that Shany
argues is important.
In the final section of Part I Shany describes the method of measuring
goal attainment. This is an admittedly difficult exercise and he argues that it is
best dealt with by moving away from a focus on outcomes and studying the
structure and process of international courts. This has the benefit of shedding
light on cost effectiveness and social utility. It also helps assess the feasibility
of effective outcomes through a process of "reverse engineering" (pp. 50-51).
This section is crucial from the point of view of building an empirical study
design as it lays down possible performance indicators and also clarifies the
structure and process proxies for outcome indicators.
Part II of the book moves the conversation from creating a model of
effectiveness assessment to applying that model to judicial functions and
features. This part sheds light on the nature and extent of the effect that these
functions and features have on the effectiveness of an international court. The
conclusions that are highlighted in this portion of the book are extremely
interesting and will impact the discourse on the best route to goal attainment.
Shany focuses on four features and identifies the correlation of each to
effectiveness as viewed from the perspective of goal attainment.
Jurisdiction and admissibility criteria control the caseload and determine
the range of influence of the court either directly through adjudication or
through the shadow of adjudication. Therefore it is an important feature of an
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international court and is to that extent correlated to its effectiveness (p. 75).
Shany argues, however, that the relation between the structural element of
jurisdiction and the outcome (goal attainment potential) "is not necessarily
linear" (p. 95). A reading of this section supports the intuitive understanding
that jurisdictional limits imposed by the creators of the court and the
admissibility criteria laid down by the court itself generally help increase the
potential for effectiveness, and actual effectiveness. It also serves to explain the
relative success of the court.
Second, judicial independence and impartiality influence the manner in
which judicial power is exercised (p. 97). However, they do not affect the
extent of the judicial power. Hence while it is a relevant feature for
effectiveness studies, it is difficult to identify its impact on goal attainment (p.
102). Shany claims that the goal-based model which focuses on constraints to
judicial independence rather than the "ideal type" of judicial independence can
help develop a new understanding of the relationship between this feature and
effectiveness and thereby settle the debate between those who claim that there
is an inverse relation between these features and effectiveness and those who
argue that the relation is direct (pp. 100, 109-110). This bold claim is supported
to some extent by the additions that Shany's model makes to earlier studies,
that is, independence-enhancing rules, structural attribution of impartiality, and
the need for the study of outcomes. This section is especially illuminating as it
discusses correlation using the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia
(ICTY) and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) as examples.
His conclusion that the relation is non-linear (p. 115) is supported when viewed
in light of the tension between independence and responsiveness as is borne out
by the cases of the 1999 NATO bombing in Yugoslavia and the response of the
Rwandan authorities to the ICTR Appeal Chamber's decision to release
Barayagwiza, a suspect in the Radio Mille Collines case (pp. 111-115).
Third, judgment compliance pertains to the outcome of the judicial
process. While it has been traditionally viewed as the litmus test for judicial
effectiveness, Shany argues that compliance and effectiveness are not
correlated. This challenge to the focus on compliance is echoed by other
authors (p. 118). However, Shany's contribution to the literature lies in the fact
that he dispels the myth of compliance by bringing into focus judgment content
and practices of third parties and the trade-offs between goals inherent in
formulating judgments and designing remedies (pp. 123-124). Through
reference to case studies from the European Court of Human Rights and the
International Court of Justice, Shany explains the relevance of high-aiming and
low-aiming judgments to post-judgment party conduct and the need for a more
comprehensive study of judgment compliance which combines qualitative and
quantitative elements (pp. 125-135). Considering that compliance and
enforcement have consumed the attention of scholarship on the desirability of
courts and the value of international law in general, Shany's denial of its
centrality to effectiveness has far reaching implications for the study of
international courts.
Fourth, legitimacy of the court in the eyes of its constituencies affects the
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extent to which the norms and regimes it endorses are legitimated. Of the four
features discussed by Shany, this feature bears the strongest correlation to
effectiveness to the extent that it can be considered as an intermediate goal. The
model proposed by Shany seeks to test the extent to which international courts
attain and maintain internal legitimacy (that is, securing their own legitimacy)
while conferring external legitimacy (that is, conferring legitimacy on other
institutions or principles) (pp. 137-138). This section details the contours of
legitimacy as a concept and its relation to the elements of fairness, legality,
justice and effectiveness. It locates legitimacy within the structure-process-
outcome paradigm of social science research and discusses the effect of
changes in legitimacy capital. Shany also draws links between this feature and
the earlier three features. While the section is informative, it fails to clearly
draw the distinction between legitimacy as a judicial feature and legitimacy as a
goal. The characterization of internal legitimacy as an intermediate goal makes
the application of this indicator to a study design rather problematic. If viewed
both as a goal in itself and as a factor that determines the attainment of goals,
legitimacy would have to appear as a determinate and indeterminate variable in
the operationalization of a study. This could create difficulties in the statistical
calculations of strength and direction of the variable's effect. The section would
have benefitted by a discussion of the concepts using an example.
Overall, Part II serves to highlight the strength of the goal-based model as
a tool that helps explain the interaction between international courts, their
creators, the disputing parties, and the international community. While most of
the correlations that Shany puts forth seem intuitive, the discussion helps
outline the nuanced manner in which judicial features must be understood and
calibrated if they are to support broader conclusions regarding effectiveness.
Part III is a collection of six essays co-written with members of Shany's
research team, each applying the goal-based approach to assess the
effectiveness of a separate international court. The courts analyzed are the
International Court of Justice (pp. 161-188), the World Trade Organization
Dispute Settlement System (panels and Appellate Body) (pp. 189-222), the
International Criminal Court (pp. 223-52), the European Court of Human
Rights (pp. 253-76), and the Court of Justice of the European Union (pp. 277-
306). The essays provide a brief history of each court, an identification of the
mandate provider's goals, a discussion of judicial outcomes seen as the
attainment of the identified goals, and recommendations for the direction that
future research should take. The essays engage with the literature by applying
the goal-based approach to pre-existing data sets.
By choosing a wide spectrum of courts that deal with different
international law concerns, this section serves to explain the functioning of the
model and clarifies its intricacies of its application to the assessment of
international adjudication as a whole. It is useful to the extent that it makes
replication of the model easier.
The essays certainly illustrate the advantages of the model Shany
proposes, but they also bring to the fore the biggest weakness of the book, one
that perhaps could not have been avoided in the presence of the constraints of
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time and space. While Shany diligently outlines the limitations of the goal-
based approach in providing the basis for empirical research, he certainly
understates them. The reliance on pre-existing data sets and the application of
the goal-based model to earlier studies instead of conducting original data
analysis exacerbates the difficulty of establishing measurable variables. The
biggest barrier to conducting holistic empirical research lies in the
operationalization of the variables and this step is avoided by reliance on pre-
existing data sets. The difficulties in quantification that he admittedly refers to
in Parts II and III would have been appropriately captured if the essays in Part
III had been based on data that was collected and coded first-hand. The book
fails to realistically outline the actual extent of difficulty that empirical research
in this field is bound to face. The framework that Shany lays out is so attractive
that it might be misleading. Scholars that seek to undertake empirical analysis,
including primary data collection, of the performance of international courts
might have to face challenges that have not been dealt with in the book. There
is hence a need to proceed with caution and circumspection while utilizing the
model that Shany proposes.
Through this book, Shany sets out to propose a framework within which
international courts can be appropriately assessed. The strength of the model he
puts forth lies in its normative treatment of goal attainment through the use of
judicial features contextualized as indicators of effectiveness. The book serves
as a detailed guide to understanding and applying the model and to this extent it
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